ESSAY QUESTION NO. 4

Answer this question in booklet No. 4

Steve and Linda have been married for several years. Steve is presently incarcerated at a State of Alaska medium security prison. Steve was convicted of Assault in the Third Degree (a felony) for trying to strangle Linda. Steve's only prior convictions are of domestic violence against Linda.

While Steve has been in prison, Steve and Linda have become very religious. Based on their family pastor's religious teaching, they believe that they should pray together for as long as possible. Their new religious practices also require them to embrace while praying. Their prayers must last as long as one hour.

However, prison rules limit physical contact between inmates and visitors to a brief handshake or embrace. As a result, the prison has not allowed Steve and Linda to embrace throughout their prayers. The stated purpose for this rule is to limit the introduction of contraband into the prison.

1. Discuss what state and federal constitutional claims Steve may assert to challenge the prison rules.

7/05 Page 1 of 1

GRADER'S GUIDE

*** QUESTION NO. 4 ***

SUBJECT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

I. Federal Free Exercise (40 points total)

A. General Federal Free Exercise (25 points)

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which has been applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or *prohibiting the free exercise thereof...*" (Emphasis added). See <u>Cantwell v. Connecticut</u> 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). It should be noted that this is a Free Exercise question and thus the <u>Lemon v. Kurtzman</u> (403 U.S. 602 (1971)) test is not applicable because that test is only relevant to the Establishment Clause.

Instead the appropriate standard was described by the United States Supreme Court in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990) where the court held that a neutral, generally applicable law or regulation does not offend the free exercise clause even if the law has an incidental—i.e., unintended—effect on religious practice. Here, Steve would have a difficult time arguing that the prison's regulation is not "neutral". Thus, the prison's contact visitation rules are unquestionably constitutional under this standard as they do not discriminate against religion on their face. They apply to all prisoners, and Steve would have a difficult time claiming that the rules are aimed at a particular religion.

B. <u>Federal Free Exercise and Prisoners</u> (15 points)

The Supreme Court has also established a more specific Free Exercise test regarding prison rules. The Court in <u>Turner v. Safley</u>, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) gave deference to prison rules that were "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." <u>Id.</u> at 89. In <u>Turner</u> the Supreme Court reasoned that this deferential standard was required to prevent courts from becoming unduly involved in the "intractable problems" of prison administration. <u>Id.</u> at 84-89. The Court listed four factors that are relevant to determining whether a regulation is reasonable. <u>Id.</u> at 89.

The first factor requires "a 'valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it." <u>Id.</u> (internal citations omitted). The Court has held that prison security is not only a legitimate interest, it is a compelling governmental interest. <u>Larson v.</u>

7/05 Page 1 of 4

<u>Cooper</u> 90 P.3d 125, 129 (Alaska 2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Moreover, limitations on contact visits are rationally related to this interest. <u>Id.</u> (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Here, limiting the introduction of contraband is directly related to prison security and thus there appears to be a valid rational connection between the governmental interest and the regulation. Steve might argue that, since he has no convictions for the use of weapons or controlled substances, subjecting him to a rule that is designed to limit the introduction of contraband is unreasonable. But, the <u>Larson</u> court rejected a similar argument. Moreover, while not explicitly stated as a reason for the limited contact rule, it could be argued that unmonitored and prolonged contact between the couple might well place Linda in danger given Steve's history of violence towards Linda.

The second <u>Turner</u> factor requires courts to examine "whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates." <u>Id.</u> (internal citations and quotations omitted). The "alternative means" factor merely requires that adherents not be "deprived of *all* forms of religious exercise," not that they remain free to engage in the prohibited activity. <u>Id.</u>

The question here then is whether the prohibition against physical contact between Steve and Linda deprives Steve of all forms of religious exercise. Arguably, it does not as Steve and Linda may pray together; they are just not allowed to do so while in prolonged physical contact.

The third <u>Turner</u> factor requires courts to consider "the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally." <u>Id.</u>

It is not absolutely clear what impact allowing Steve and Linda to embrace during prayer would have on guards and other inmates. But one could imagine that the close monitoring of the couple during an hour long prayer would place some burden on the guards and might decrease visitation opportunities for other inmates.

The final <u>Turner</u> factor requires courts to consider whether there are any "ready alternatives" to the policy in dispute. <u>Id.</u> at 130. The Supreme Court made it clear, however, that "[t]his is not a 'least restrictive alternative' test: prison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint." <u>Id.</u> at 131. The Court further suggested that only those alternatives that would accommodate the prisoner's rights at "*de minimis* cost to valid penological interests" could be considered relevant to a court's inquiry into whether a regulation is reasonable. <u>Id.</u> at 131. As stated above the increased monitoring of Steve and Linda would likely rise above the level of de minimis and thus it

7/05 Page 2 of 4

cannot be said that there is an obvious easy alternative to the prison's contact visitation rules.

II. <u>Alaska's Free Exercise Clause (</u>60 points)

A. General Free Exercise under the Alaska Constitution (40 points)

Article I sec. 4 of the Alaska Constitution states that "No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."

The seminal Alaska case on the free exercise clause is <u>Frank v. State</u>. 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979). In <u>Frank</u> the Alaska Supreme Court, established the following three part test: The free exercise clause may be invoked by a person against state action (or inaction) only where: (1) there is a religion involved; (3) the conduct in question is religiously based; and (3) only where the claimant is sincere. <u>Id</u> at 1070 (internal citations omitted).

If this test is met, then the state must show a compelling state interest to not accommodate religious practices or beliefs. Specifically, the state must show a "substantial threat to public safety, peace or order or where there are competing governmental interests that are of the highest order and are not otherwise served." <u>Id.</u> at 1070-73. Further, the fact that there is a compelling state interest itself is not enough. The burden is on the state to establish actual harm to the state interest. The <u>Frank</u> court stated: "The question is whether the interest, or any other, will suffer if an exemption is granted to accommodate the religious practice at issue." <u>Id.</u> at 1073.

Absent such actual harm to a compelling state interest, the Alaska Constitution requires an exemption from the laws at issue to accommodate religious practices. <u>Id.</u> at 1073-74.

It should be noted that this very high standard differs from the standard adopted by the Federal Courts in interpreting the Federal Constitution where the law is facially neutral and of general applicability. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Com'n, 874 P.2d 274, 279 (Alaska 1994). The Alaska Supreme Court has explicated rejected this lower standard and has reiterated the application of the "compelling state interest" standard with respect to the Alaska Constitution. See id. at 280-81.

Under the <u>Frank</u> standard, Steve would argue, under the Alaska Constitution, that: religion is involved; the conduct in question is religiously based (praying while embracing on the advice of a pastor); and there is no indication that he is not sincere in his religious beliefs. Under this framework for the prison's rules to be constitutional the prison must show that allowing Steve and Linda to embrace would pose a substantial threat to public safety and order. The state

7/05 Page 3 of 4

could argue that this burden is met because of Steve's assaultive history against Linda.

C. <u>Alaska Free Exercise and Prisoners</u> (20 points)

However, the <u>Larson</u> court "tempered" the application of Frank with regards to prisoners holding: "subjecting the day-to-day judgements of prison officials to an inflexible strict-scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper the ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration." <u>Larson v. Cooper</u> 90 P.3d 125, 132 (Alaska 2004) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

Applying this more deferential standard, the <u>Larson</u> court held that prison rules that limited physical contact did not violate Alaska's free exercise clause because of the increased financial and security burdens that would be placed on the prison. <u>Id</u>. at 132-33.

Accordingly, it is unlikely that Steve would prevail under the free exercise clause of the Alaska Constitution.

7/05 Page 4 of 4

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

Alaska Bar Examination

JULY 2005

This Book is for your answer to Question No. 4 Only

Be Sure to Write in the Proper Book

Steve's state and Federal constitutional claims will Revolve around the details of the: 1st Amend No establishment of Religion and Free Exercise of Religion: 14th Amend Equal protection analysis at the Fed level and at the Alaska Hote level

under the Federal constitution the 14th Amendment Appoints and designates the 1st Amendment Applicable to the states as well as the Fed 900. The 1st Amendment is called one of the Fundamental Rights of the citizens of the U.S. The 1st Amend Requires NO establishmen of religion in the government, But allows the Fuel exercise of Religion by citizens. These Rights ob the 1st Amend are Applicable to the Fed government through the 1st Amend and are Applicable



to the state government through the 14th Amend.

Here, steve is inconcented in the state of Alaska prison.

Therefore steve is entitled to his Fundamental Rights of the 1st Amend exercise of Religion and NO establishment of Religion.

No establishment of Religion

The 1st Amend states the government shall not establish a Religion,

ie promote, Fund, encourage, demand,

Require a specific Religion or

the practice thereof.

In this case if steve claims we wants freedom to practice his Religion by Embracing in prayer," it will not require the state prison to establish, Fund, encourage, require, demand etc a specific Religion. By allowing steve to "emblace in prayer" the state prison will not be establishing a Religion under the 1st Amend. Therefore under the 1st "No establishment of religion" steve is not asking the state prison to violate the fed constitution and he should be allowed to "embrace in prayer."

Fuel Exercise of Religion

The 1st Amend states it is a Fundamental right of every citizen to be able to freely exercise their own Religion and Religious practices. In this case If steel nonestly + truly believes that "embracing in prayer" is the only way to exercise his religion and Religious beliefs, then he must be allowed to Practice his religion. merdore under the 1st swend. steve must be allowed to exercise buelly his religious practices.

Equal Protection

The Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amend demands that every person be treated equally under the law. It separate classes at people are created and they are treated whereatly then and Equal protection claim may be brought.

In this case, a classes of people one established, the non "embracing in prayer" class and the "embracing in prayer" class.

therefore the equal protection analysis must be sought.

Fed Equal Protection

The Fed Equal Protection analysis Repuires Strict scruting For any 1st Amendment Fundamental Rights & violations. This is the highest degree of scruting and require the state to prove the law is vecessary for a compelling Ruposl. (Intermediate Regulates and Rational Basis are Not regd here so I will not discuss them) this case the suison must prove that not allowing their NO" embracing in prayer" law



is for a necessary t compelling purpost. The prison will argue that they are tuying to keep contrabound + weapons out ob the tailed community wheras steel will argue his 1st Amend Rt. IF there is No other way to make sure centualsand + weapons are kept out of the failed community the court will probably Rule in Fower of the purson. unless there is a newscay t compellary purpod for the law, steve will be able to "embrace in prayer"

200

state Equal Protection

The state equal protection analysis is unique in Alaska. Since this case is in a state of AK prison, the Equal protection arralysis will be under the state analysis Rather than the Fed analysis. AK state EP analogsis does not separate into 3 separate certegories. pather it is a sliding scale Basis. The court will look at the personal rotelest of the person and the purpose of the law upon balancing these 2 factors, the minimum

Regd is a <u>substantial</u> t

In this cash steven personal intliest is his Fundamental Rt to gree exercise of Religion the prison purpose of the law is to keep out contraband + weapons to protect the railet community. The court will probably hold that protecting the jailed community out weights steves interest in "enplacing in player" therefore tere will probably be denied his Right to practice a Didiain he truly and Authentically

001051

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

Benchmark 2

Alaska Bar Examination

JULY 2005

This Book is for your answer to Question No. 4 Only

Be Sure to Write in the Proper Book

1) Steve's State Castilutural Claims

Freedom of Pelegim (Free Exercise)

Under the Almson Constitution, all persons have the right to the free exercise of their religious Beliefs, AS A findomntal right. Steve still again the prison prohibition as to touching his wife aurong prayer directly inhibits steve prison practicing his region while in prison a isomething of his right to the exercise of religion.

IN Questions involving the free exercise of relegion,

Alasca Courte apply A 3 part test. Courte consular:

1) Whether A religion is involved;

2) What is the panty's religious Belief is sincare, a 3) What is the poble of the governmental regulations that advantly affects the religious practice. Here Steve may across his now-bound religion

Here, Steve may augue his new-Bound religion
reasons Steve a his wife hinda to proceed actor
The State is AN Actor
together for as long as possible. Steve may steine.

the love asset his compuct of praying with his

wife, Lenda, is celesimsly motivates, a fact the anduct IN Queshm (i.e., touching his wife while they pray together) satisfies element #/. as to the second element, the sincerity of Stumes Belief (conduct, the count und went to elicit feshmy him Stemes pasher as to the fenets of Steves religion, to cletermine whether Steves cleane to have physical contact with his wife is firmly grounded in a sincere religious Belief or practice.

Cos to the 3rd element of the religious exercise test, the court will consider what effect the "contact" prohibition of the prism has upon Steves right to heely exercise his religion.

although the headen to exercise one's religion is a Rudamental right, the prism also has a eligitimate "punological interest" in maintaining Infuty & Security of Alaska prisms, Because it is likely that people and muy possibly try to pass centra Band or weapons home a visitor to an inmote of they were allowed to have extended physical contact with each other, the court and purbably hold IN Favore of the pruson IN prohibitry Steve Rom touching Lunda while they preased together at the

2 Eaval Protection Claim Stem could agree the prisms

"an tret publishing

4

violates his right to the Educal protection of the laws since it prohibits him him fully exercising his ruligions practices while IN prism, while allowing NM-INMotes to huly prism luxulation impinses upon steves right to frely exercise his religion by touching his wife unite they pray at the prism. Scale test to determine whether an government rate that punides dissimilar treatment to 2 similarlysibilitée armps violates coupl protection. The count avalyses the wahre of the right that 15 affection, the pumpose of the state law IN Questin a then Balances the pumpose of the law against the right that is Affected. alasica counts recover At AMINIONEM, that A /Aw have A FAIR & SUBSHAWHA/ rula trenship to a

A Strictor fest to determine A low's validity thin the fercial fact, as the AK Censh July provides Broader freeding I'M ag thin mich.

such as the freedom of exercise of religion,
the combs many the Shate to cleams brake
that the law is necessary to Sulfill A
compulling shate intust.

Hure, the state has an important a Conjulling interest IN mainthing safity, security a order IN AK prisms. The anti-contact provision is necessary to make sure prism visitors do not pass weapons or other antraBAND to prism IN mates uncles the guse of affection or, in this case, prayer Between a husband in make a his visitor-wife.

Stuis claim and fail under an EOVA/
protection analysis, Because the State
red to regulate softy a security IN
prism outwighs Streets assurted need to
touch his wife while the pray,

2 Fectoral Chams -

Store can augue the prison rule violates his fuedom to exercise his religion under the 1st Amediant to the US Censtitution, so Applies to the States By the 14th anadomnt.

Federal Edual protection analysis reasons

A court to Apply Strict Scruting in

Cases where state repulations impige upon the

Exercise of a sindamnihal right.

Under the fearal strict scrutary analysis,
the State has the Burdin of proving the
law is necessary to Sil Sill a compelling
government objective.

Here, the prism may validly argue
the prism must be able to place
restrictions upon physical contract
between INmotes 6 visitors as a
punological interest IN main training safety
IN the prism.

001062

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

Alaska Bar Examination

JULY 2005

This Book is for your answer to Question No. 4 Only

Be Sure to Write in the Proper Book

4)

I. State Action

Since an agency of the state, the state prison, is acting here, there is clearly state action. Accordingly, any action by an Alaskan agency must not only comport with the U.S. Constitution, but also with the possibly narrower and more stringent Alaska state Constitution.

II. Free Exercise of Religion

Steve may assert that the prison rules burden his free exercise of religion under the fist Amendment to the U.S. constitution and the Alaska state Constitution. Federal law applies the standard established in the recent *Smith* case, a U.S. Supreme Court case, which holds that a rational basis test applied to free exercise claims and the purpose of the law in question must have been to burden religion. A law that burdens the free exercise of religion as applied only is constitutional under *Smith*. Alaska law, however, applies the more rigid test formulated in the *Swanner* case, which holds that a law's purpose can be neutral, but still may be unconstitutional under the Alaska state Constitution, if the law burdens religion as applied. In *Swanner*, a landlord would not rent apartments to unmarried couples. Because of the landlord's religious convictions, the landlord believed that renting to "fornicators" was wrong. However, a state law and city ordinance prohibited landlords from discrimination in who they rent to based on marital status. The Alaska Supreme Court formulated a test to determine if a law unconstitutionally burdens the free expression of religion. The burdened party must show that religion is involved, that the burdened party's actions were based on religion, and that the burdened party is sincere in their religious belief. If these questions are answered in the

affirmative, the burden shifts to the state to show that the law is necessary to maintain order and safety, or that the law furthers a compelling government purpose of the highest order. The Court held that Mr. Swanner, the landlord, had met his burden of showing his religion was sincere, but that prohibiting discrimination based on marital status is a compelling government purpose of the highest order, and the law was upheld.

Tangentially, Mr. Swanner refilled his claim in federal court, seeking review under the *Smith* standard. Inters tingly, the federal court found Mr. Swanner's claim valid under the *Smith* standard, but not under the *Swanner* standard. Today, there appears to be a split in authority in federal courts over which test to apply. However, the *Swanner* test remains good law in Alaska and is applicable here.

Here, applying the *Swanner* standard, it is clear that religion is involved and that Steve's desire to challenge the prison rules are based on religion. It also appears that Steve is sincere in his belief. The facts do not indicate that Steve is not motivated by sincere religious belief. Assuming that Steve can show this, the burden shifts to the state. Here, the first and second prong of the test are implicated. The prison has an interest in not allowing physical contact between inmates and visitors in order to prohibit the introduction of contraband. This appears to be a legitimate concern. Clearly, order and safety of other inmates and guards may be compromised if contraband is introduced. It is also a reasonable assumption that some inmates may take advantage of a more flexible approach to religious practices and use the process to gain introduction of contraband. Therefore, the state most likely has a strong interest in the law in order to maintain order and safety.

Similarly, the state most likely has a compelling interest of the highest order in rehabilitating inmates. Part of the purpose of the penal system is punitive. The state may argue that by giving inmates a lot of freedoms, even if they are religiously based and sincere, destroys this purpose of the penal system. Furthermore, many inmates may abuse this privilege and that

would run contrary to the purpose of prisons in the first place. It is most likely that the government would also be able to meet their burden of showing that the law here is of a compelling government interest of the highest order. The prison rule is most likely constitutional.

III. Equal Protection

Steve may also have an equal protection claim here. Equal Protection is based on the notion that two similarly situated parties should not be treated different. This arises from the U.S. Constitution's 5th Amendment's guarantee of "equal protection under the laws of the U.S." This has been extended to the states under the 14th Amendment. Equal Protection jurisprudence in Alaska is different, however, than under the federal jurisprudence. Alaska equal protection law is based on a sliding scale instead of a rigid tiered approach in the federal system. Alaska law looks to see how the two parties are being distinguished, then asks what is the nature and strength of the interest being burdened, then looks to the purpose for the law. Alaska law then calls for a balancing test to be performed between the nature of the burdened interest and the state's interest in the law.

Here, the distinguishment is between someone of Steve's religion, which requires intimate physical contact to perform religious ceremony, and people of other religions, which do not require such contact. The nature of Steve's interest is relatively strong because religion is traditionally regarded in our culture as an important freedom and virtue. The government, however, also has a very strong interest in maintaining order in prisons and regulating the introduction of contraband. Steve may argue, here, that the government may assert that interest in a different manner by searching the inmates after each religious session, and that the law is overbroad for that stated interest. However, the government can counter with the

notion that such a system is inefficient and not necessarily fool proof. Again, as discussed above, the government also has an interest in reforming prisoners and instituting punitive measures, which giving inmates the right to see visitors in such a manner severely compromises. In sum, the government's interest most likely outweighs Steve's interest, and the law will probably be upheld under Equal Protection scrutiny.

IV. Substantive Due Process

Substantive Due Process is very similar to the Equal Protection Analysis and share a common jurisprudential history. Many of the early federal "equal protection" type of claims were filed as substantive due process claims. A substantive due process claim is appropriate where a fundamental right is involved, but the burdened party is not being treated differently than other similarly situated parties. While it is possible that Steve may assert an equal protection claim, a due process claim is also open to him.

Alaska due process analysis is similar to the analysis under the U.S. Constitution. If a fundamental right is involved, the state must have a compelling government interest and the law must be narrowly tailored to fit the purpose. Religion is most likely to be viewed as a fundamental right. Steve should argue that the law is not narrowly trailored to fit the stated purpose, restricting contraband. The jail can search the prisoners after the religious ceremony. This is a strong argument. However, it is clear that the government also has other interests in punitive measures against prisoners. However, since the stated basis for the law is to restrict contraband, Steve may have some success with this claim.

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

Alaska Bar Examination

JULY 2005

This Book is for your answer to Question No. 4 Only

Be Sure to Write in the Proper Book

4)

Steve may attempt to assert a substantive due process claim, a procedural due process claim, an equal protection claim, a free exercise claim, an establishment clause claim, a free speech claim, and a privacy claim.

I. Substantive due process

In Alaska, where a fundamental right is not involved, substantive due process requires only that the state has passed a law with a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose. It assures only that laws are not entirely arbitrary.

Here, Steve has no viable sub. due pro. claim. The state's regulation preventing his embracing-facilitated prayer is rationally related to the legitimate state aim of ensuring prison safety.

There would appear to be no federal substantive due process claim either as this does not involve a fundamental right separate and apart from rights governed by more specific amendments (see below).

II. Procedural due process

In Alaska, as in the Federal system, procedural due process claims are governed by the Eldridge factors. First, the court looks to the importance of the liberty or property interest denied a

claimant and to the benefits additional procedures would have conferred onto the claimant.

Second, it looks to the risk of error associated with the process that denied that liberty/property interest. Finally, it balances against the cost of the requested procedure against the state's interest in efficiency and cost-minimization.

Here Steve was deprived of a potentially viable liberty interest. He cannot freely associate with his wife. That said, he has no viable pro. due. pro. claim as the deprivation was imposed attendant to his sentencing for assault and the courts would clearly find that process satisfactory.

III. Equal Protection

In the State of Alaska, equal protection of the laws is afforded by a "sliding scale" analysis. After determining that the challenged law discriminates or differentiates persons into separate classes, the court, first, the court looks to the importance of the equal protection right which has been assailed by the law, second, it looks to the government's purpose in enacting the law and, third, balances the one against the other. At minimum, Alaska requires that there be a "fair and substantial fit" between the government's regulation and its aim—a minimum requirement that is more exacting than the minimum level required by Federal analysis.

Federal equal protection analysis is quantized. First, federal courts will look to see if a law is discriminatory on its face. If it is, the court will determine whether the discriminated-against class is "suspect," "quasi-suspect," or not suspect. Laws employing a suspect classification must meet the exacting strictures of strict scrutiny—they must be defended by the state as necessary to achieve a compelling state purpose. Laws employing a quasi-suspect must be defended by the state as

substantially related to an important state aim. Finally, laws deploying non-suspect classifications need only be rationally related to a legitimate state purpose; the claimant has the burden of proving that the state law fails in that regard and the courts will go out of their way to rescue a law and impute a legitimate aim to it (Williams Lee Optical).

Here, Steve can claim that the law discriminates against the incarcerated on its face. He might also allege a disparate impact claim against his religion, but absent some showing of state animus that claim would be a non-starter in both state and federal court. He might also claim that it discriminates against those wedded to the incarcerated.

For federal purposes, classification according to incarceration status is not a suspect classification. Because the law affects prison safety, it will be upheld.

Similarly, it is unlikely that the state courts would deploy much more than the "fair and substantial" fit analysis here, and the law is fairly and substantially related to prison safety. Certainly the denial of more involved physical contact would so-adjudicated. The time-limitation imposed by the state is, to be sure, more arbitrary, but here again, seeming fairly and substantially related to safety concerns.

Steve would not seem to have a viable equal protection claim.

IV. Free Exercise

In the federal system, the Smith-Lukumi rubric holds that religious adherents can claim no

exemption from a neutral, generally applicable law, absent a showing of animus.

Here Steve cannot show animus, the law is facially neutral as between various religious sects, and generally applies to all persons incarcerated (a class that can include any religious or non-religious person.) Steve thus has no federal free exercise claim.

Alaska still deploys the strict scrutiny analysis of <u>Yoder-Sherbert</u>, however. Under the statenuanced regime, the court will look to see, first, whether religion is involved in the claim, second,
whether religion motivates the conduct at issue, and third, whether the claimant's religious belief is
sincere. If all three strictures are met, the court will grant an exemption unless denial is necessary to
achieve a compelling state purpose. In this context, the supreme court has noted that only public
safety, peace and good order, and other interest of "the highest order" will justify denying an
exemption.

There is no evidence on the facts that Steve's new-found religious belief is insincere and it definitely would seem to be involved and (at least to a large degree) motivate his desire for protracted embracing. The court would then ask whether the two limits imposed by the law-physical and temporal--are truly necessary.

More than likely the court would grant a temporal exemption and permit Steve to embrace for his minimum required one hour. It would be difficult for the state to show that time-limited contact is vital to effect prison safety.

The limits on involved physical contact presents a closure question, but given the option of

close monitoring of the contact and subsequent searches of the prisoner's person (to find any contraband conveyed), the court would likely grant this exemption as well.

V. Establishment clause

Steve might argue that the rules are hostile to his religion and, as such establish some alternate form of religion in the state. This will be unavailing.

Federal and state courts both deploy the <u>Lemon</u> test in this area. Under the test, laws must, first, be primarily motivated by a secular purpose, second, have the primary effect of neither advancing nor inhibiting religion, and third, not involve excessive entanglement with religion.

Steve cannot show any of the prongs have been violated; the law is motivated by, and has the primary purpose of effecting prison safety and involves no entanglement with religion.

VI. Free Speech

Steve might also argue that he has an expressive right to meet and associate with Linda. This claim will also fail him.

Alaskan and Federal analysis is substantially similar here. Content-neutral laws in non-public fora are valid if regulations of time, place and manner which are substantially related to achieve an important state purpose and leave open alternate channels of communication. Laws may be even more exacting where the government acts not in its "governmental" mode, but in its "managerial

mode". It may, for instance, ban leafleting on military bases.

Here, the state likely has managerial authority to regulate speech and expressive <u>Spence</u> conduct in the prison. Even absent that, however, the state could surely show that it was substantially related to the important interest of prison safety, and all Steve is still free to express whatever he would like to Linda in his meetings and/or letters.

VII. Privacy

Finally, Steve might argue, similar to <u>Breese</u> (involving hair length) or Ravin (involving marijuana usage in the home) that he has some viable privacy interest in praying with Linda. That would seem to fail.

Alaska deploys a <u>Katz</u> test to determine the threshold question of whether a viable privacy interest is impugned by a challenged law. First, the claimant must have had an objective expectation of privacy. Second, that expectation must be one society is willing to accept as reasonable.

Here, as a prisoner, Steve did not likely expect unfettered access to his wife; most certainly society would no so-adjudge such an expectation as reasonable.

001047

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

Alaska Bar Examination



This Book is for your answer to Question No. 4 Only

Be Sure to Write in the Proper Book

4)

Free Exercise of REligion

Steve may assert both state and federal claims in challenging the prison rules that prohibit him from embracing his wife while praying. Under the federal COnstitution, persons are guaranteed the right to free exercise of religion. (This right is only protected against action by the government. The prison is an arm of the government, enforcing laws and punishments imposed by the state so the constituion applies to the prison's rules.) However, an individual's right to free exercise of religion is often in competition with other goals of the state of rights of other individuals. The test under the federal Constitution was outlined in Smith, where the USSC held that if a law that affects an individual's right to exercise religion is neutral and generally applicable then it is valid, even if it incidently affects someone's exercise of religion. On the other hand, if the law is not neutral but targets religious practices specifically, the law must pass strict scrutiny review, being narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest.

Here, the prison rule that limits physical contact between inmates and vistors does affect Steve's practice of his religion. This rule is apparently neutral and generally applicable in that it applies to all contact that isn't brief in nature and does not target religiously based physical contact. Consequently, the prison rules would be upheld under federal law.

Even if a court found that the rule is not neutral, it should withstand strict scrutiny review. The state has a compelling interest in keeping contraband out of the prison for the safety of the inmates and prison staff. The limit on physical contact is closely tailored to achieving that interest although Steve could argue that performing a full body search on each of the individuals involved and then allowing them contact would be a least restrictive alternative. Given the intrusive nature of such a solution, however, Steve would probably lose under that argument and the prison rule would be upheld.

Alaska state law, however, provides at least as much, and probably more, protection than does the federal test. The Alaska constitution also guarantees the right to free exercise of religion but it has adopted the Swanner test. Under the Swanner test, if a law is neutral, the plaintiff must first show that 1) a religion is involved, 2) the conduct at issue is religiously based, 3) the religious beliefs are sincere. The burden then shifts to the state to show that it has a compelling state interest in not granting an exemption for the religion involved. The state can meet this burden by showing that the law is necessary to protect public safety, peace and order OR by showing that there are state interests involved of the highest magnitude that cannot be served by other means and that granting the exemption would actually harm the interest the state is attempting to achieve. This test was further developed in the Frank case which involved a Native taking a moose out of season for a religious funeral potlatch. The court held that an exemption should be granted.

Here, Steve can show that a religion is involved because he is apparently part of an organized religion that has a pastor and everything. The conduct at issue, praying while embracing, is religiously based because their family pastor has directed them, as part of religious worship, the pray together while embracing for as long as possible. Arguments could be made over whether Steve's religious beliefs are sincere. Steve and Linda have just recently become religious and the practice seems highly suspect given Steve's situation as an inmate. However, the facts indicate that Steve has become "very religious" and the fact that they are willing to pray together for an hour seems sincere. Steve could probably make this part of his case.

The burden would then shift to the state. The state could show that is has a compelling state interest in keeping contraband out of the prison in order to protect the safety of individuals there as well as to keep order and peace. If weapons or drugs were getting into the prison, people could be injured, especially when those things are in the hands of convicted violent

offenders.

As discussed above, while there may be alternatives to the rule limiting contact, such alternatives would be even more intrusive into a person's rights (such as their right to privacy) and probably would not provide as much protection against the transfer of contraband as the current rule provides.

Additionally, the state is generally granted more freedom in regulating conduct at a prison even when it infringes on constitutional rights then it does when regulating citizens on the street.

Right to Privacy

The Alaska Constitution explicitly contains a right to privacy rather than being found in the "pneumbras" of the constitution as the federal courts have found the federal right to privacy. Thus, while Steve could make a privacy right claim under either constitution (since the federal right is applied against the states through the 14th amendment) he would probably have a better chance under the Alaska constitution since it seems to offer more protection than the federal constitution.

Under the privacy right, the court will first look at whether a privacy right exists. The court will ask whether 1) the person has a subjective privacy interest in the choice or activity being impaired by the rule and then at 2) whether the privacy interest is one that society is objectively willing to recognize as a reasonable privacy interest. If the answer to each of those is "yes", the court must still balance the privacy interest against the interests of society. This is kind of a sliding scale approach in which the closer the privacy interest comes to the center of personal autonomy, the greater the burden on the state to show that the legislation is justified.

Here, Steve has a privacy interest in enjoying religious/spiritual and physical closeness with his wife. Aspects of the relationship between husband and wife have been held by the

courts to reach to level of a fundamental right. Society also generally recognizes that the husband/wife relationship is sacrosanct and deserves to be protected from undue government intrusion.

Society also has a interest, however, in keeping contraband out of the hands of violent felons, the stated purpose of the prison rule. This interest, as discussed above, is best achieved by limiting contact between inmates and visitors. While the burden on the government to show that the rule is narrowly tailored to achieve the interest may be great, the government should be able to meet the burden because this is the least restrictive means of achieving the interest since other alternatives (such as strip searching and etc) would be much more intrusive into personal autonomy.

Substantive Due Process

Where a fundamental right is being implicated by a rule or regulation, it must pass strict scrutiny review to be valid. Under strict scrutinty review, the rule must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. Free exercise of religion is a fundamental right since it is guaranteed in the 1st amendment. However, the prison rule, as discussed above, is narrowly tailored and is the least restrictive means of achieving prisoner safety.

Equal Protection

Steve's right to equal protection may also be implicated. First, Steve must show that the government is treating similarly situated people differently. He could argue that felons are being treated differently than non-felons or that felons in medium security prisons are being treated differently than people in low security prisons. Steve might not win such an argument since the people involved are not actually similarly situated, some are convicted felons and some are not.

If the court did find that the state was treating similarly situated people differently, then Alaska would apply a sliding scale approach where the court would weigh: 1) the interest impaired by the rule, 2) the purposes of the state's action, 3) the government's interest in using the particular means to achieve the stated goals. The interest impaired is the most important factor because depending on how important it is, the greater or lessor the burden on the government to justify its actions.

The federal government applies strict scrutiny review if a suspect classification is involved: race, national origin, ethnic identity. It applies intermediate level review to quasi suspect clases such as gender, where the rule must be significantly related to an important state interest. And applies rational basis review to other classes, where the plaintiff must show that the rule is not rationally related to achieve a legitimate state interest.